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Abstract
This paper examines the role of coalition formation in the empirically observed neg-
ative correlation between employment protection and unemployment benefit. We
study an economy composed of four groups of agents (capitalists, unemployed peo-
ple, low- and high-skilled workers), each one represented by a politician. Politicians
first form political parties and then compete in a winner-takes-all election by simul-
taneously proposing policy bundles composed of an employment protection level and
an unemployment benefit. We first show that, in the absence of parties (i.e., in a
citizen-candidate model), low-skilled workers are decisive and support a maximum
employment protection level together with some unemployment benefit. We then
obtain that, under some conditions, allowing for party formation results in all policy
equilibria belonging to the Pareto set of the coalition formed by high-skilled work-
ers together with unemployed people. Policies in this Pareto set exhibit a negative
correlation between employment protection and unemployment benefit.
JEL Codes: D72, J65, J68
Keywords: bidimensional voting, party competition, citizen-candidate, coali-
tion formation, labor market rigidities
1 Introduction
In most countries, labor markets institutions such as employment protection, unem-
ployment benefits and minimum wage legislations prevent private parties from freely
setting prices or quantities, creating rigidities. These rigidities may be at least in
part socially efficient in a second-best sense. For instance, in a world where workers
could be hired and fired at a hat’s drop and at no cost for the employer, workers
would have little incentive to acquire firm-specific skills. Employment protection
could then provide incentives for workers to increase their productivity. Similarly,
unemployment benefits provide insurance for risk-averse workers affected by random
employability shocks.
Making the point that some rigidities may be optimal (see Blanchard and Tirole,
2007, among others) of course does not mean that the current level of rigidities is
the optimal one, or that it is determined by a social planner maximizing some
measure of welfare. As for the first point, many economists blame rigidities for
high (long term) unemployment, especially in Europe, and have been advocating
for a long time making the labor market more flexible (see for instance OECD Jobs
Study, 1995). Despite these recommendations, many governments have failed to
successfully implement such plans (see Section 5.1 in Boeri et al., 2006, or Saint-
Paul, 1996). Part of the literature has then taken a turn towards political economy
explanations of both the emergence of labor market institutions and the resistance
against moves towards more flexibility.
The same type of approach has been adopted by several papers studying the po-
litical economy of labor market institutions. These papers have in common that they
adopt an insider-outsider view of the labor market, pitting currently employed work-
ers against currently unemployed agents, and that they build a unidimensional model
which focuses on a single institution, either unemployment benefits (UB thereafter,
see Wright(1986), Persson and Tabellini (2000), Pallage and Zimmermann (2001))
or the employment protection level (EPL from now on, see Saint-Paul (1999, 2000,
2002)).1 Several papers try to understand the emergence and/or continuation of two
types of equilibria, an “American” (or “Anglo-saxon”) one with low UB or low EPL,
and a “continental European” one with large UB or EPL. They differ in the economic
model adopted (they build upon the seminal paper by Wright (1986) or rather use
some version of a matching or a costly search model), the political economy equi-
librium (direct majority voting or the maximization of the utility of some class of
agents) and the reason why the “American” and “continental European” equilibria
differ. Koeniger and Vindigni (2003) stress the importance of product market reg-
ulation and the way it affects the demand for EPL. Both Hassler et al. (2005) and
1Boeri and Burda (2003) study how the (exogenous) EPL level affects the political support for
rigid wages versus individualized Nash bargaining.
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Belot (2007) resort to variations in the costs and benefits of mobility. Hassler et
al. (1999) build on Wright (1986) by adding the possibility to save and borrow as
a self insurance mechanism against the loss of one’s job and show how it affects the
equilibrium UB level. Vindigni (2008) studies the impact of dynamic idiosyncratic
uncertainty on the political support for EPL. Brügemann (2006) shows that whether
EPL creates its own political support depends on whether separation between firms
and workers are voluntary or not. Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002) build a political
economy model whose objective is to explain the emergence of both EPL and tempo-
rary jobs in many European countries. Finally, Brügemann (2003) studies whether
international economic integration is likely to affect the cross-country variation in
EPL.
Focusing on a single institution (UB or EPL) at a time is an interesting first step,
but does not allow to explain an important stylized fact documented by Buti, Pench
and Sestito (1998), Boeri et al. (2006) and Chung and Jeong (2008): namely, that
there exists a negative correlation across OECD countries between both dimensions,
with countries exhibiting low employment protection and large insurance programs,
and vice versa. The objective of our paper is to understand the role of coalition
formation in explaining this negative correlation between employment protection
and insurance.
Addressing this question requires building a voting model with endogenous polit-
ical coalitions and a bidimensional policy space. It is our opinion that a meaningful
depiction of labor markets must allow voters to differ in more than one dimension.
We wish to distinguish three ways in which voters may differ from each other. First,
they differ in their main source of income (workers vs capitalists). Second, at any
point in time, workers may be employed or not (the insider-outsider conflict). Third,
employed workers may differ in their ability. Given that agents differ on more than
one dimension, the decision making process should put a lot of emphasis on the polit-
ical alliances that these different groups of voters may strike with each others. This
in turn means that we wish to depart from the usual two party approach adopted in
a large part of the political economy literature. It seems to us very difficult to state
ex ante which party represents which voters. Saint-Paul (1996, p.281) discusses this
point at length, criticizing the idea that left wing parties represent “labor” while
right-wing parties are biased against it. We consider it much more fruitful to allow
voters to be represented by politicians who decide which alliances to strike with each
other and which political parties to form. In such a framework, both the number of
parties and their constituents are endogenous at equilibrium.
We adapt the economic model from Pagano and Volpin (2005) to fit our purpose.
The economy is populated with capitalists and workers. A subset of workers are hired
in the initial stage and can invest in firm-specific human capital in order to increase
their productivity. They differ in their ability to become more productive, which
can be either low or high. Productivity is observable by all but non contractible.
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The firm then tries to fire low-productivity workers (those who have not invested or
for whom the investment has not paid off) in order to replace them with lower-paid
currently unemployed workers. This attempt to fire people may be voided in court
with a probability that increases with the degree of employment protection. The
public policy consists of both this EPL and a tax which finances an UB. The vote is
taken at an interim stage, when workers have already invested in human capital but
before the investment has proved fruitful or not. We assume that no group forms
a majority by itself, that low-skilled workers form the largest group, and that they
form a majority when they join forces with either the high-skilled workers or the
unemployed.
Our modelling of political competition is based on Levy (2004). Her approach is
particularly well suited to our problem, since (i) unlike in the traditional Downsian
model, equilibria in pure strategies do exist with multidimensional policy spaces and
(ii) both the number and the constituency of political parties are endogenous. At
the voting stage, there are four groups of citizens (capitalists, unemployed agents,
low- and high-skilled workers), each represented by one politician. These politicians
first form coalitions (parties) and then compete in a winner-takes-all election by
simultaneously proposing policy bundles composed of an EPL and an UB. The
incentive to form a party resides in the ability to enlarge the set of credible proposals:
while individual politicians are restricted to proposing their most-favored policy (no
other proposal would be considered as credible by voters), parties can propose any
policy that is in the Pareto set of their constituents (i.e., any policy that may be the
result of efficient bargaining between party members is deemed credible by voters).
The equilibrium of this game is then composed of a partition of politicians into
parties and of the vector of policies proposed by these parties.2
Our results run as follows. Both capitalists and unemployed agents prefer no
EPL while workers (both low- and high-skilled) prefer maximum EPL. In terms of
UB, capitalists want none while unemployed agents would like a very large one.
Employed workers are in between, with low skill workers preferring a larger benefit
than high skill workers. Preferences of unemployed and (especially high-skilled)
workers are thus very much opposed. As a result, the Pareto set of these two
groups trades-off a lower protection level against a larger employment benefit – i.e.,
it exhibits a negative correlation between those two dimensions.
In the absence of political parties (i.e., when each group is represented by a
citizen-candidate restricted to either running with his most-favored policy or not
2There are few models where the number of parties is endogenous. Two recent examples are
Iaryczower and Mattozzi (forthcoming) and Eguia (forthcoming), although the latter focuses on
parties of parliamentary origin (i.e., voting blocks among legislators) rather than arising as the
result of interactions between candidates and voters in elections).
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running in the elections), the unique equilibrium policy consists of the most-preferred
package of the low-skilled workers: a very large EPL together with a moderate UB.
We then show that allowing for the formation of political parties drastically changes
the set of equilibrium policies.3 We obtain that, provided that high-ability workers
and unemployed agents can agree on some policy that both strictly prefer to the
most-favored policy of the low-ability workers, there exists an equilibrium where
high-ability workers and unemployed coalesce in a party and win by proposing a
policy with some positive UB and EPL. We then state two other conditions that,
if satisfied, jointly insure that the only policies that are proposed in all equilib-
ria belong to the Pareto set of the coalition made of high-ability workers together
with unemployed agents. We claim that these conditions are empirically relevant,
so that the predictions of the model accommodate the empirically found, negative
correlation between job protection and insurance. In particular, our model is con-
sistent with the emergence of policies that contradict the intuition from standard
median voter approaches. Section 5 offers a discussion of these results, including
the presentation of a real world example fitting the results of our model.
Before embarking on the description and solving of the model, let us briefly re-
view the related literature. Our paper sits at the intersection between two different
literatures: the theoretical literature on the political economy of labor market insti-
tutions described above and the one devoted to coalition formation and its impact
on the determination of public policies. The latter has been surveyed by Dhillon
(2005). She distinguishes models of pre-election coalition formation (such as the
model we develop here) from post election coalition (or government) formation.
Pre-election coalition formation models differ in the main motivations for parties to
form (mainly, the sharing of the costs of running for elections, the enlargement of the
set of credible promises –as in our paper–, and the coordination of voters decisions),
the predictions on the size and number of parties, the models and the equilibrium
concepts employed. All papers surveyed by Dhillon (2005) assume a generic pol-
icy space, either uni- or bi-dimensional, with Euclidean preferences. Other papers
have applied the modelling and solution concepts developed in these contributions
to specific economic environments. Variations of the coalition formation approach
that we use in this paper have been applied to the study of the public provision of
education by Levy (2005), to diversity and redistribution by Fernandez and Levy
(2008), to environmental policies by Anesi and De Donder (2011), and to minority
ideological positions by Anesi and De Donder (2009).
The two papers closest to ours are the only papers, to the best of our knowledge,
3As observed by a referee, the assumption that decisions regarding the two policy dimensions
are taken simultaneously is also crucial, since the equilibrium policy bundle would remain the same
if coalitions chose the two dimensions separately - see Levy (2004).
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to address the joint political determination of two policies affecting the labor mar-
ket. Pagano and Volpin (2005) analyze the political determinants of investor and
employment protection. We have simplified the part of their model that deals with
the capital financing of the firm while we have introduced an UB. Observe that, in
our model, the UB is driven by two competing logics (see saint-Paul (1996), p.274):
an “insurance logic” (since the benefit provides income in case workers are fired)
and a “wage formation logic” (the UB is the outside option of workers – increasing
their outside option also increases the competitive wage paid by the firm). We differ
totally from Pagano and Volpin (2005) in the setting of the political choice mech-
anism, since they adopt a probabilistic voting setting with two parties and obtain
results that crucially depend (as always within the probabilistic voting approach)
on assumptions regarding the distribution of ideological bias among the different
categories of voters.
The other close paper is Boeri et al. (2011), who also analyze political equilibria
in a model of voting over UB and EPL. In their paper, the negative correlation
between UB and EPL results from political mechanisms other than coalition forma-
tion. More specifically, we differ in both the economic and the political modeling.
Their economic model is an extension of Wright (1986), with workers varying in
their skill levels. Both EPL and UB are set up in such a way that they redistribute
in favor of low-skilled workers. The modelling of the public decision making pro-
cess assumes that people vote separately on the two dimensions, and a (so-called
Shepsle or induced) equilibrium is such that each instrument is set at its majority-
favored level given the other instrument. Low-skilled voters are decisive in both
votes and there is substitution between EPL and UB since “a higher level of unem-
ployment insurance for the low-skills reduces the cost, in terms of consumption, of
being unemployed; thus leading a low-skill insider to require a lower degree of EPL
(p. 15).” Whether low-skilled voters prefer a large EPL or UB very much depends
on the amount of redistribution associated to each instrument. The authors show
that “more earning inequality or a more progressive UB system involve more cross-
skill redistribution (...) thereby making unemployment benefits more appealing to
low skill types (p.15).” The driving force for the negative relationship between UB
and EPL in our model is different and comes from the fact that the Pareto set for
high-skilled workers and unemployed exhibits such a relationship, with unemployed
preferring a large UB and a small EPL while (high-skilled) employed have opposite
preferences.
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2 The Economic Environment
2.1 Basic Setting
We consider an economy populated by a continuum of citizens of measure 1 + ,
 2 (0; 1), which is partitioned into two economic classes: workers and capitalists.
Workers own labor and no capital; capitalists own capital, but no labor. The measure
of workers is one, so that the measure of capitalists is .
There are three goods in the economy: labor, capital, and a consumption good
(the numeraire) produced by a single firm using labor and capital as inputs. Its
Leontieff production technology exhibits a labor-capital ratio equal to ~`. All workers
have the same labor endowment, normalized to 1, that they rent to the firm in
exchange of a wage. Each capitalist has the same capital endowment, k, which is
offered to the firm in exchange for a share in its ownership. Capitalists then share
equally the profit (revenue minus wage bill) of the firm.
The total stock of capital is k so that the firm initially hires a mass `  k ~`
of workers in exchange of a promise of a wage wI (where the subscript I stands
for initial). We assume that ` < 1 so that there is some unemployment in the
economy. Workers hired at this stage can make a costly effort in order to improve
their productivity (such as investing in firm-specific human capital for instance). If
they choose not to make this effort, their productivity is y. If they choose to make the
effort, they incur a disutility cost  > 0 but have a probability xi of increasing their
productivity to y+ (if the effort fails to prove fruitful, their productivity remains
y): There are two groups of workers differing in their ability to transform effort into
higher productivity: 0 < xL < xH < 1: The proportion of high-ability workers is
denoted by , with a majority of low-ability people among workers ( 2 (0; 1=2)).4
Individual productivity is observable, but not contractible.5
After having observed individual productivities, the firm may try to fire some
workers in order to replace them with cheaper unemployed individuals, who are
offered a wage wR (where R stands for restructuring). However, every attempt to
lay off a worker can be voided by a court with probability () 2 [0; 1), where 0 > 0,
(0) = 0 and (1) < 1.6 We assume that it is too late at this stage for unemployed
4Saint-Paul (1996) reckons that “unskilled and semi-skilled workers (...), including workers with-
out a college degree, make up more than 70% of the workforce in most European countries.”(p.275)
5The noncontractibility of individual productivity may be viewed as a characteristic of the pro-
duction technology. We refer the reader to Pagano et al. (2005, foonote 10) for further justifications
of this assumption.
6The OECD measures employment protection as the strictness of procedures and costs involved
in dismissing individual workers, including dimensions such as severance payments, administrative
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people joining the firm to invest in specific human capital, so that their productivity
is y.
At the end of the game, payoffs are distributed according to the status of indi-
viduals at that time. The individuals who are unemployed at the end of the game
receive an unemployment benefit, denoted by . The wage paid to people working
in the firm depends upon their seniority: people employed since the initial stage are
paid wI (irrespective of their –non contractible– productivity) while people hired at
the restructuring stage are paid wR. Capitalists share equally the profit of the firm.
Everybody pays the same lump sum tax   0, whose proceeds finance the unem-
ployment benefit. The unemployment benefit  is obtained using the government
budget constraint
(1  `) = (1 + ): (1)
The tax  forms the first component of the public policy. The second component
is the degree of employment protection,  2 [0; 1]. Public policy is decided, by
majority voting, after the workers hired at the initial stage have invested in specific
human capital, but before the result of this investment is observed (by workers and
the firm). Observe that the unemployment level 1   ` does not depend on the
unemployment benefit  nor on the job protection policy  in our model.
We now summarize the timing of the game:
Stage 1 (Initial hiring) Capitalists invest all their capital in the firm. The firm
hires a measure `  k ~`< 1 of workers in exchange of the promise of a wage
wI .
Stage 2 (Workers’ investment) Employed workers decide whether to invest in
firm-specific human capital.
Stage 3 (Voting) A government is democratically elected to implement a policy
vector (; ), with the unemployment benefit  determined by the budget
constraint (1).
Stage 4 (Restructuring) Employed workers and the firm learn about employees’
individual productivities. The firm may try to replace some of them with cur-
rently unemployed agents in exchange of a wage wR. However, every attempt
to lay off a worker can be voided by a court with probability () 2 (0; 1).
and procedural costs and advance notices to be served. The crucial feature of EP for our model is
that it reduces the employment inflows/unemployment outflows, decreasing the probability that a
currently employed worker loses her job to a currently unemployed. The assumption (introduced
by Pagano et al. (2005)) that the lay off attempt is voided by a court with a probability increasing
in the EPL  is a straightforward (if not totally realistic) way to capture this feature.
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Stage 5 (Production and consumption) Output is produced, capitalists receive
the firm’s profit, employed workers are paid their wage (wI or wR depending
on their seniority), and unemployed workers obtain the unemployment benefit.
All pay the lump sum tax  .
All agents care only for the amount of consumption good consumed (they derive
no benefit from leisure and so no disutility from working) and use their entire after-
tax income to purchase that good. They all have the same preferences over private
consumption, which are represented by a von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
U : R+ ! R, with U(0) = 0, U 0 > 0, U 00 < 0, and limc!0 U 0(c) =1.
2.2 Wage setting
The firm is a monopsonist on the market for labor. In a frictionless economy, the
firm would offer the smallest wage that is acceptable to the workers (the competitive
wage). We rather assume that workers are able to obtain a gross mark-up   1 on
the competitive wage.7 We solve the game backward, starting with the restructuring
stage (since there is no decision to be taken at the last stage). Agents have no
disutility from working, so that the competitive wage for newly hired workers is
equal to their outside option, the unemployment benefit . The wage offered to new
workers at this stage is then
wR =  = 
1 + 
1  ` (2)
where the second equality is obtained from the budget constraint (1). The after-tax
income of these workers is
    =  1 + 
1  `   :
The before-tax income of unemployed agents is the unemployment benefit  =  1+
1 `
with the corresponding after-tax income     =  `+
1 ` . Observe that a consequence
of (2) is that the firm has an incentive to fire low productivity workers (in order to
replace them with unemployed agents) as soon as the competitive wage in the first
stage is larger than the unemployment benefit (i.e., as soon as wI > ).
7This mark-up may arise for various unmodelled reasons, such as frictions in a search model,
bilateral bargaining between firm and worker, or existence of a trade-union as in Lee and Roemer
(2005). Without such a mark-up, individuals would be indifferent between working and being
unemployed, and thus indifferent as to the EPL.
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The rest of the paper will be devoted to the study of the third, majority voting,
stage. In order to solve that stage, we need to construct individuals’ preferences for
the policy options  and . This in turn requires to solve for workers’ decision to
invest or not in human capital, and for the wage wI that is offered to them in the
first stage. To do this, we assume for the moment that a policy pair (; ) has been
chosen and we move to the second stage, where voters choose whether to invest or
not in human capital.
Making the effort of investing in human capital has a sure cost, , and an uncer-
tain return. This return takes the form not of a higher wage (because productivity is
not contractible), but rather of a larger probability of remaining employed. Hence,
for workers to choose to make this effort, it must be the case that (i) their wage if
they remain employed is larger than the employment benefit they would receive if
fired, and (ii) the firm tries to fire workers of low productivity, and only them (if
the firm’s decision to fire did not depend on the productivity of the worker, then no
worker would have an incentive to make the effort, and thus no one would exhibit a
high productivity at equilibrium).
We then look at the case where the firm’s owners (the capitalists) benefit when
the workers of type i choose to make the effort of trying to be more productive.
This in turn means that the firm tries to fire all workers with low productivity (and
only them). Anticipating this, workers of type i make this effort only if the expected
payoff from making the effort is larger than the expected payoff if they do not make
the effort:8
[xi + (1  xi)()]U(wI   ) + (1  xi) [1   ()]U(   )   (3)
 ()U(wI   ) + [1   ()]U(   ):
The payoff when investing (the left-hand side of (3)) increases with ability (because
the investment has a larger chance to succeed) while the payoff when not investing
(the right-hand side of (3)) does not depend on ability, so that if the constraint is
satisfied for low ability workers, it is also satisfied for high ability workers. We show
in Appendix 1 that a large enough value of  guarantees both that the capitalists’
payoff is strictly positive at equilibrium, and that the firm’s profit is larger when all
workers are induced to invest in human capital. The intuition is straightforward,
since a large value of  makes the investment very productive for the firm (and
hence its owners).
8Throughout the paper, we make use of the Law of Large Numbers (since there is a continuum
of citizens) so that the measure of workers who (un)successfully invest in human capital can be
computed with certainty. We refer the reader to Mukoyama and Şahin (2005) for a characterization
of the optimal wage contract in settings where the current (hidden) action of an worker has a
persistent effect on the future outcome.
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We then solve for wI in (3) and we obtain the competitive wage wc — the
minimum wage offered in the initial stage that would induce all employed workers
to invest in human capital — as
wc =  + U
 1

U(   ) + 
[1  ()]xL

> : (4)
Let us now move to the first stage and to the setting of the wage wI . The firm’s
owners (the capitalists) set the wage at a level corresponding to the gross mark-up 
over the wage level (4): a worker hired in the initial stage and keeping his job until
the end of the game will receive a wage of wI = wc: His final after-tax income is
then wc    . Finally, we assume that individuals have a larger expected payoff if
they get hired in the initial stage than if they were to remain unemployed at that
stage. We show in the next section that this assumption is satisfied provided that
the effort cost  is low enough.9
We are now in a position to study the preferences of agents at the voting stage.
2.3 Voter preferences
Policy preferences in the third stage depend upon voters’ type . Voters can be
i-ability employed workers ( = ei; i 2 fL;Hg), unemployed ( = u), or capitalists
( = c). Recall that, at the voting stage, all currently employed agents have already
incurred the cost associated to their effort to be more productive, but are yet to
know whether this effort will prove fruitful. Workers as well as currently unemployed
individuals form expectations as to their status in the final stage of the game, and
thus as to their final payoff.
Let p : [0; 1]  feL; eH ; ug ! (0; 1) be the probability for a voter of type
 2 feL; eH ; ug to be employed at the production phase when the EPL is . This
probability is given by
p(; ) 

xi + (1  xi)() if  = ei; i 2 fL;Hg
(1 x)[1 ()]`
1 ` if  = u;
where x  xH + (1  )xL is the average proportion of high productivity workers
(equal to the expected proportion by the law of large numbers). We define the policy
space as P  [0;  ] [0; 1] for some exogenous value of  .10
9It is straightforward from the definitions of wR,  and wI that all workers and unemployed
agents enjoy positive after-tax consumption at equilibrium.
10We need to impose an exogenous value of  as upperbound because tax proceeds are increasing
with  in the absence of preference for leisure.
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Voters’ policy preferences over P are then given by:11
V (; ; ) 
8<:
p(; )U (wc   ) + [1  p(; )]U
 
 `+
1 `

if  2 feL; eHg;
p(; )U
 
 1+
1 `   

+ [1  p(; )]U   `+
1 `

if  = u;
U
 
[y + x  w (; )] `

   if  = c;
(5)
where w (; ) denotes the average wage paid in the production stage and is given
by
w(; )   f[x+ (1  x)()]wc + (1  x) [1  ()] g :
We make the following reasonable assumptions on the distribution of voters’
types:
Assumption 1 (a) 1+
2
> (1  )` > max; 1  `+ 
2
	
.
(b) 1 +  < 2min f`; 1  `g :
(c) ` < xL
1 (xH xL) :
Assumption 1(a) guarantees that the low-ability employed form the largest group
but fall short of the majority. It also implies that the capitalists form an electorally
small group of voters.12 Assumption 1(b) states that employed people constitute
a majority of voters, as well as low-ability employed together with unemployed.
Observe that we make no assumption on whether low-ability workers together with
capitalists form a majority, or whether the complement made of high ability workers
together with unemployed forms a majority – i.e., we allow for  + (1   )` 7
`+1 `: As for Assumption 1(c), it guarantees that the probability for an individual
unemployed (at the voting stage) of finding a job is lower than the probability for a
worker employed (at the same stage) of remaining so (given that s/he has invested
in human capital):
p(; ) > p(; u) for  2 feL; eHg and any (; ) 2 P:
11Recall that the effort cost  has already been sunk at that stage, and thus does not appear
in policy preferences. Also, the wage wI has already been set by the firm in the initial stage. As
we focus on subgame perfect equilibria, we assume in the rest of the paper that wc is given by (4)
where  and  are set at their equilibrium value (i.e., the value that the firm has anticipated at
the initial stage of the game).
12The addition of half the capitalists to the unemployed on the right hand side of assumption
1(a) is not strictly necessary to obtain our results, but it allows to simplify the proof of Proposition
1 below. It does not imply that capitalists play no role in the election, as will be clear in section 4.
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This in turn implies that the number of workers effectively fired at the restructuring
stage does not exceed the number of people unemployed at that stage:
(1  x) [1  ()] `  p (; u) (1  `) < p (; eL) (1  `)  1  ` .
Observe that Assumption 1(c) together with wc >  implies that, at the third stage,
employed workers are better off (in expectation) than unemployed workers:
V (; ; ) > V (; ; u) for  2 feL; eHg and any (; ) 2 P:
This does not imply that the initial stage expected welfare is larger for employed
workers than for unemployed agents, since employed workers anticipate that they
will have to subtract the effort cost  from V (; ; ). We then assume that  is
low enough that individuals have a larger expected payoff in the initial stage if they
get hired than if they were unemployed at that initial stage.13
Our model admittedly abstracts from important labor market phenomena, such
as the presence of disutility from working, tax distortion from financing unemploy-
ment insurance, moral hazard or self-insurance. It is also static, the game described
above being played only once. Introducing any of these elements or making our
setting dynamic would render this model much more complex14 without affecting
much the qualitative results (in terms of preferences of the four groups for EP and
UB):15 preferences of voters would be less extreme than in our simple static game,
with people unemployed when voting favoring some EPL (since they would hope to
become insiders at some point later on, for instance) and a lower-than-maximum tax
rate (for the same reason, or because of tax distortion or moral hazard phenomena),
while employed workers would favor a less-than-maximum EPL. For a very large
range of assumptions, we would nevertheless keep the same ranking of preferences
as in the one-shot game, with for instance people employed at the time of voting
preferring a larger EPL than currently unemployed. In other words, even though
our simple model is geared towards a generous provision of both EP and UB, what
matters for our results is the shape of preferences of the four group of voters, and
these shapes are robust to the introduction of many frictions into the model.
We now introduce our definition of the political equilibrium concept.
13It is straightforward to see that agents are better off when employed in the initial stage if
 = 0. By continuity this is also true for small values of .
14With the unemployment rate being a function of the policy decisions  and  , for instance.
15Observe that simply repeating stages 2 to 5 would not alter our results if the labor policies
chosen at stage 3 were valid only for one period (i.e., assuming that a new vote takes place after
each investment decision).
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3 Voting
The main difficulty when voting over multidimensional policy spaces is the absence
of Condorcet winner (i.e., of a policy bundle that is preferred by a majority of
voters to any other feasible bundle). This in turn means that a classical Downsian
political competition model with two parties interested only in winning elections has
no equilibrium in pure strategies. We propose to adapt the model of Levy (2004),
which has two extremely nice features. First, equilibria in pure strategies exist even
with multidimensional policy spaces. Second, both the number and the constituency
of political parties are endogenous. We present that approach in the context of our
paper, but refer the reader to Levy’s paper for an in-depth discussion of the basic
assumptions.
Each group of voters is represented by a single politician who is a perfect repre-
sentative of her group, in that her policy preferences are given by (5).16 Politicians
running alone are unable to commit to any proposal differing from their ideal pol-
icy. The key assumption of Levy (2004) is, however, that politicians can credibly
commit to a larger set of policies by forming political parties (or alliances): the set
of policies a party can commit to is the Pareto set of its members.17 Formally, a
politician is an element  of  while a party is a non-empty subset S of . A policy
(; ) 2 P is in the Pareto set of party S, denoted by PS, if there is no other policy
( 0; 0) such that V ( 0; 0; )  V (; ; ) for all  2 S and V( 0; 0; ^) > V(; ; ^)
for some ^ 2 S.
The political game we study has two stages. The first stage is one of party for-
mation, while the second stage encompasses electoral competition, where all parties
simultaneously choose a feasible policy and compete in a winner-takes-all election.
We now describe how each stage takes place, beginning with the electoral competi-
tion game.
Electoral Competition
A party structure is a partition of  into parties. Let  be the set of party structures.
We assume that the result of the party formation stage is some arbitrary party
structure  2 . Elections then proceed as follows. Every party S 2  chooses
16This corresponds to the citizen-candidate approach pioneered by Besley and Coate (1997)
and Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and applied to lobbies and strategic campaigning by Chambers
(2007).
17Models of endogenous party formation differ starkly in terms of the ability of parties to commit.
At one extreme, Roemer (2005) allows parties to commit to any policy, while, at the other extreme,
Gomberg et al. (2004) restrict parties to aggregate the preferences of their members.
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an electoral strategy (or platform), namely a policy (S; S) 2 PS [ f?g, where ?
means that the party proposes no policy (we say that it does not run). In the case
where no party runs for election, every politician receives a zero payoff. If at least
one party runs, we assume that voters record their preferences sincerely over any
list of candidate platforms, p  f(S; S)gS2, and that the election is by plurality
rule with no abstention.18 The election outcome is then a fair lottery between the
policies in
W (p) 

(S; S) : S 2 argmax
S02
vS0(p)

where vS0 (p) is party S 0’s realized vote share. In line with Levy (2004), we assume
that if a party is indifferent between running and not running, it chooses not to run.
Let  (S) be the indicator function on 2 taking the value of 1 if  2 S and 0
otherwise. Members of the winning party equally share an (arbitrarily small) non-
policy benefit b > 0 (ego-rents, perks of office...). As a consequence, the expected
utility of politician  resulting from a profile of strategies p is given by
U(p; )  1jW (p)j
X
(tS ;eS)2W (p)

V (S; S; ) +  (S)
b
jSj

if there is at least one party S 2  such that (S; S) 6= ?, and U(p; ) = 0 otherwise.
Given a party structure  2 , a vector of electoral strategies p = f(S; S)gS2
is a -equilibrium of the electoral-competition game if no party S 2  can make all
its members better-off by deviating to another platform; that is, for all S 2 , there
is no ( 0S; 0S) 2 PS [ f?g, ( 0S; 0S) 6= (S; S), that satisfies
U (( 0S; 0S) ;p S; )  U ((S; S) ;p S; )
for all  2 S, with at least one strict inequality. In line with Levy (2004), we restrict
ourselves to partisan equilibria, where voters strictly prefer their party’s platform (if
their party proposes one) to any other party’s platform. And to avoid repeatedly
having to include the relevant qualification, we leave it as understood that any
reference to -equilibria is actually to partisan -equilibria. We also adopt the rule
that if a party is indifferent between running and not running, it chooses not to run.
Let () be the set of -equilibrium policy outcomes.
18Voters who are indifferent between several policies use a fair mixing device. We refer the
reader to Baron et al. (forthcoming) for a model in which the electorate votes strategically by
taking into account the likely governments that parties would form based on their representation
and the policies they would choose.
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Stability of Party Structures
Up to this point, we have taken the party structure  as given. We now turn to the
party formation stage and ask whether  is a stable party structure. First of all,
note that there may exist multiple -equilibria, and therefore multiple equilibrium
outcomes (() may not be a singleton). Thus,  may satisfy stability conditions
for one electoral outcome but not for others. As a consequence, we will not study
the stability of  alone, but the stability of pairs (;p) where p is a -equilibrium.
We will refer to them as political states. Which of these should be considered as
the set of equilibrium outcomes for the present model? The answer to this question
depends on the stability requirements imposed on party structures.
Let  and 0 be two party structures. 0 is said to be induced from  if 0 is
formed by breaking a party in  into two or by merging two existing parties in 
(forming a new party made up of subsets of current parties is excluded on the basis
that nobody would trust a politician who is willing to betray her current partners).
Now, we say that the political state (;p) is blocked by another political state (0;p0)
if there exists S 2  such that (i) S can induce 0 from , and (ii) for every  2 S:
U (p0; ) > U (p; ). We thus define equilibrium political states as follows.
Definition 1 Let  2 , and let p be a profile of electoral strategies. The pair
(;p) is an equilibrium political state (EPS) if it satisfies the following conditions:
 p is a -equilibrium, and
 there is no political state (;p) that blocks (;p).
Thus, an equilibrium situation is defined as one that meets two requirements:
first, the policy platforms result from the electoral competition between existing po-
litical parties; second, in every existing party, politicians have no incentive to break
up their party or form a new party in order to favor different electoral outcomes.
We are now in a position to apply this political equilibrium concept to the eco-
nomic environment described in the previous section.
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4 Analysis of Equilibrium Political States
4.1 Policy Preferences
This section describes voters’ objectives and sources of conflict. The following lemma
describes the voters’ most-preferred policy bundles.19
Lemma 1 Let (^(); ^()) be the ideal policy of a voter of type . Then
 = ^(u)  ^ (eL) > ^ (eH) > ^(c) = 0;
and, for every i = L;H,
^ (ei) = 1 > ^(c) = ^(u) = 0:
The preferences in terms of protection policy  are easy to establish. Unem-
ployed individuals’ utility is decreasing in employment protection, since it prevents
them from working and earning the wage wR that they prefer to the unemployment
benefit . Capitalists also dislike any increase in the protection level because it
increases the average wage they have to pay to workers by making it more difficult
to replace low productivity workers by lower-paid unemployed. Employed workers’s
utility is increasing in  (whatever their ability) because a larger protection level
increases their probability to stay on the job and they are better-off employed than
unemployed.
The tax  is paid by everyone. For capitalists, taxation is an especially bad deal
because it increases the wage they have to offer to previously unemployed people.
They thus oppose any increase in  . Unemployed people favor any increase in 
since it raises both the unemployment benefit and the wage they would receive
if hired later on. The optimal tax for employed people trades off two concerns:
on the one hand, they dislike paying taxes but, on the other hand, a larger tax
increases the unemployment benefit they would get if fired. The optimal tax is
positive since the marginal benefit of taxation grows arbitrarily large as the tax
(and thus the unemployment benefit) tends towards zero. The optimal tax is higher
for low-ability people because their probability of losing their job is higher than for
high-ability workers.
Figure 1 represents both the four categories of voters’ most-preferred policy bun-
dles and their indifference curves in the P space. Capitalists favor no taxation and
no job protection. The slope of their indifference curves is everywhere negative,
19Proofs are relegated to Appendices.
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since they have to be compensated for a higher tax by a lower protection level. The
arrow labelled “c” depicts the direction of increasing utility. Unemployed workers
favor no protection together with a maximum value of the tax. The slope of their
indifference curves is always positive. The slope of the worker’s indifference curve is
negative for low values of  (where the individual would like to increase both  and
) and positive for larger values of  (where the tax is too large given the protection
level). A similar analysis applies to the low-ability employed.
Insert Figure 1 around here
The Pareto set for the group composed of high-ability workers and unemployed
will play a crucial role in our results and is thus represented on Figure 1. At any
interior point along this set, the indifference curves of both types are positively
sloped. For the high-skilled workers, this is due to the substitutability between
UB and EPL. There is no such substitutability for the unemployed, who always
prefer a larger UB and a lower EPL. Under mild conditions on preferences (see
condition C1 below), the Pareto set is interior to P and downward sloping,20 with
the unemployed’s utility increasing (and high-skilled workers’s utility decreasing) as
one moves in the southeast direction along that curve –i.e., as one increases the UB
and decreases the EPL.
4.2 Unemployment Benefit vs. Employment Protection
We are now in a position to determine the political equilibrium values of UB and
EPL. A straightforward intuition would suggest that, as the low-ability employed
form the largest group and are median voters in both dimensions of the policy
space (taken separately), equilibrium policies should reflect their preferences (rel-
atively low UB and very high EPL). This intuition is confirmed by Proposition 1
below, which characterizes the unique political equilibrium in the standard citizen-
candidate model without party formation –i.e., when we do not allow candidates to
coalesce so that their only choice is whether to run (with their most-preferred policy
bundle) or not. This means that the party formation stage is a necessary ingredient,
in our model, to explain the emergence of the other equilibria empirically observed
(such as those with low EPL and large UB).
Proposition 1 Let 0  ffeHg ; feLg ; fug ; fcgg. Then,  (0) = f(^ (eL) ; ^ (eL))g.
20Proof available upon request to the authors.
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With the citizen-candidate approach (corresponding to the partition of candi-
dates labelled as 0 in the statement of Proposition 1), the set of admissible policy
bundles is restricted to those most-preferred by the four types of candidates. Propo-
sition 1 follows from the fact that the most-preferred policy of low-ability workers is
preferred by a majority of voters to any of the most-preferred policies of the three
other types. From Assumption 1(b), the low-ability workers together with either the
high-ability workers or the unemployed form a majority. We show that high-ability
workers prefer (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)) to (^ (u) ; ^ (u)) because they dislike both the high
tax and the absence of protection favored by the unemployed. Unemployed indi-
viduals prefer (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)) with its positive unemployment benefit and wage to
the zero unemployment benefit and wage favored by the capitalists at (^ (c) ; ^ (c)),
even if the former policy gives them a smaller chance of finding a job than the
latter. Unemployed agents also prefer (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)) to (^ (eH) ; ^ (eH)) because
of the low tax favored by high-ability workers (both policies share the same em-
ployment protection level). Hence, the unique one-candidate 0-equilibrium has the
eL-candidate running alone and implementing her ideal policy. The rest of the proof
of the Proposition shows that low-ability workers are powerful enough that there is
no 0-equilibrium with more than one candidate running for office.
Proposition 1 implies that, in the absence of parties, low-skilled workers are
decisive and support a maximum employment protection level together with some
unemployment benefit. We now show that equilibria more consistent with empirical
evidence emerge in the more realistic framework where politicians are allowed to
coalesce into parties. We proceed in two steps. We first show in Proposition 2 that
there exists an equilibrium with parties (an EPS as defined in the previous section)
where the policy bundle implemented at the equilibrium belongs to the Pareto set of
high-ability workers and unemployed. We then present and discuss two assumptions
that together guarantee that the only policies proposed in all equilibria with parties
belong to the same set (Proposition 3).
Proposition 2 makes use of the following condition:21
C1 9(; ) 2 PfeH ;ug : V (; ; ) > V (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL) ; ) ; 8 2 feH ; ug.
Condition C1 states that high-ability workers and unemployed agents can agree
on some policy that both strictly prefer to the most-favored policy of the low-ability
workers. As we show formally in Appendix 6, this condition is satisfied provided that
xH is large enough that high-ability workers have a very low chance of losing their
job and so are concerned mainly with the tax. In that case, high-ability indifference
21For the sake of generality, we state formally conditions C1 to C3 in terms of endogenous policy
preferences. We show formally in Result 1 in Appendix sufficient conditions on xH and (1) under
which they are satisfied.
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curves through point (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)) are close to vertical (see Figure 1) and both
types eH and u would benefit from a decrease in tax accompanied with a large
decrease in employment protection.
Proposition 2 (i) If C1 holds, then there exists an EPS (;p) such that
 = ffeH ; ug ; feLg ; fcgg , and  ()  PfeH ;ug:
(ii) If C1 does not hold, then (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)) is the unique policy outcome in all
EPSs; that is: in every EPS (;p),  () = f(^ (eL) ; ^ (eL))g.
Proposition 2 states that, if C1 holds, then there exists an EPS where high-ability
workers and unemployed coalesce in a party and compete in elections with the low-
ability workers and capitalists running separately. The party formed by types eH and
u wins the election by proposing a policy with some positive tax   and employment
protection level  that they both prefer to the most-preferred policy of low-ability
workers. Assumption C1 is crucial since it guarantees the existence of such a policy.
Moreover, if C1 does not hold, then the second part of Proposition 2 shows that
the unique policy outcome in all EPS is the most-preferred policy bundle of the
low ability workers. The intuitive reason for this result runs as follows. We have
assumed that low ability workers form a majority if they join forces with either the
high-ability workers or the unemployed. To break the power of the type eL, it is
then necessary that there exist some policies attainable by a coalition of types eH
and u (i.e., in their Pareto set) that they jointly prefer to the most-preferred policy
of type eL. If this condition does not hold, then type eL can always “divide and rule”
by attracting either type eH or type u.
We show in the proof of Proposition 2 that, if C1 holds, then ( ; ) is preferred
by a majority of voters to both (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)) and (^ (c) ; ^ (c)) and constitutes an
equilibrium of the partition. In other words, the most-preferred policy bundle of
types eL is no longer a Condorcet winner when parties are allowed to form and C1
holds, since a majority of voters prefer some policies in the Pareto set of the party
made of types eH and u.
To prove that this political state is indeed an EPS when C1 holds, we have to
show that no candidate has an incentive to split the party he belongs to, or to join
another party or candidate. Types eH and u have no incentive to disband their
party, since Proposition 1 has shown that this would result in the most-preferred
policy of type eL. They also have no incentive to form a larger party (with either
type eL or c), since such a party cannot bring them both a better policy, while they
would have to share the spoils of office among a larger number of members. Finally,
we show that types eL and c have no incentive to form a party together because
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such a party would have no chance of winning the election. Observe that this last
statement holds even in the case where eL and c together represent a majority of
the electorate. The reason is that, for any policy x in the Pareto set of eL and c,
there always exists a policy y in the Pareto set of eH and u that is preferred to x
by either eL or c (in addition to eH and u). Policy y then beats x with a majority
constituted of three out of the four types of voters.
In order to prove that the only policies that are proposed in all EPS belong to the
Pareto set of the coalition made of high-ability workers together with unemployed
agents, we need to impose two further conditions:
C2 V (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL) ; u) > max(;)2PfeH;cgV (; ; u).
C3 8 > ^ (eH), V (^ (eH) ; ^ (eH) ; eL) > V (; 0; eL).
Condition C2 states that unemployed agents prefer the most-favored policy of
low-ability workers to any policy in the Pareto set of the coalition of capitalists and
high-quality workers. As for the previous condition, C2 is satisfied if xH is large
enough, so that high-ability workers favor a very low value of the tax (see Result 1
in Appendix 6 for a formal statement and its proof). In that case, all policies in the
Pareto set of the coalition made of high-ability workers and capitalists exhibit low
values of the tax rates, which are very detrimental to unemployed workers.
Condition C3 states that low-ability workers prefer the most-favored policy of
high-ability workers to any policy with no employment protection. This will be the
case if, for instance, (1) is close to one, since in that case the most-preferred policy
of low-ability and high-ability workers do not differ much from each other (see Result
1 in Appendix 6).
To summarize conditions C1 and C2 hold if xH is large enough, while C3 holds if
(1) is large enough. Observe that the latter condition is rather innocuous, as we are
at liberty to construct the set of admissible policies as we wish. Also, some extreme-
left European politicians such as Olivier Besancenot in France clearly advocate such
policies, where firing workers would be made illegal except in very extreme circum-
stances. As for the first condition, it has large empirical support (see Saint-Paul,
2007, Table 5, for the US and for France, for instance).
Given the innocuity or large empirical support for assumptions C1 to C3, we
concentrate on the case where they all hold and we obtain:22
Proposition 3 If C1-C3 hold then, in every EPS (;p), ( ; ) 2  () implies
that:
22We show in Appendix 7 that other EPS may exist if either C2 or C3 is not satified, while C1
holds.
20
(i) ( ; ) 2 PfeH ;ug, and
(ii) V ( ; ; )  V (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL) ; ) ,8 2 feH ; ug.
We already know from Proposition 2 that, if C1 holds, there exists at least one
EPS where the equilibrium policy belongs to the Pareto set of types eH and u. The
role played by C3 in the proof of Proposition 3 is easy to ascertain: it prevents the
formation of a coalition made of unemployed individuals and of capitalists, since any
such coalition, by proposing no employment protection, would induce the formation
of a coalition of (low- and high-ability) workers which would win the elections by
proposing the most-preferred policy of the high-ability workers.
The role played by C2 is more subtle, since this condition, which seems on the face
of it to favor the low-ability workers, ends up being detrimental to them. Under C2,
low-ability workers are powerful enough to obtain their most-preferred policy when
running against both an unemployed candidate and a coalition made of high-ability
workers and capitalists. As a consequence, there is no EPS with a partition from
which low-ability workers can induce (by splitting a party) this specific partition.
At the same type, this partition is not part of an EPS, since the three other types
of agents have an incentive to form a party together in order to implement a policy
that is in the Pareto set of the unemployed together with the high-ability workers.
In other words, C2 makes low-ability workers powerful enough to resist a party made
of high-ability and capitalists, but not powerful enough to fend off a grand party
made of all other types.
Finally, observe that part (ii) of Proposition 3 puts lower- and upper-bounds on
the values of  and of  that emerge at equilibrium. These bounds are determined by
the eH- and u-politicians’ utility levels at the low-ability workers’ ideal policy. This
policy plays the role of an “outside option” in the platform choice of parties involving
those politicians, since they can threaten to break up any party they belong to and
induce party structures in which the low-ability workers’ ideal policy emerges as the
political outcome.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a theoretical model consistent with the empirical obser-
vation of a negative correlation between EPL and UB across countries. The crucial
ingredient in our model is that politicians are allowed to coalesce and form political
parties. They then propose policy bundles composed of an UB and EPL and com-
pete in a winner-takes-all election. The importance of party formation can be seen
by comparing Propositions 1 and 3. Proposition 1 shows that, when candidates are
not allowed to form parties and are restricted to choosing between running on their
21
own or not running at all, the unique equilibrium is the most-preferred policy bundle
of low-ability workers –i.e., large EPL together with some UB. Proposition 3 shows
that, under certain assumptions, this policy bundle is not an equilibrium anymore
when candidates are allowed to form parties. In that case the “decisive” party is
the one made of high-ability workers together with unemployed. The set of policies
proposed at equilibrium by this party exhibits a negative relationship between UB
and EPL. We contend that the conditions which guarantee that only equilibria of
that type can emerge are either innocuous (the maximum allowable probability that
a current worker’s job is protected from the firm’s firing attempts is large enough)
or empirically relevant (high skilled workers have a low probability that the firm
would try to fire them).
The rationale we provide for the empirically observed negative relationship bet-
ween UB and EPL differs from the one provided by Boeri et al. (2011). In their
model, low-ability workers are decisive in both the choice of UB and EPL. The
negative correlation between UB and EPL is due to their substitutability for the
decisive group. Although this substitutability also holds in our model, it is not the
main driving force being our results. Coalitional considerations are at the core of
our argument, and the negative relationship is driven by the fact that the decisive
coalition is made of high-ability workers and unemployed, whose contract curve has
precisely this feature.
The fact that the decisive coalition is made of unemployed and of high-ability
workers may be surprising on two accounts: first, this coalition is made not only
of insiders (who represent a majority of the electorate), but rather of both insiders
and outsiders. Second, the insiders who team up with the unemployed are the high
ability workers, rather than the low ability workers. This second result is all the
more interesting (and surprising) that our model is biased in favor of low-ability
workers: we assume that they represent the largest group, and that they constitute
a majority when they join forces with either high-ability workers or unemployed (and
even may be with capitalists – we make no assumption on the size of this coalition).
Our results illustrate that size is not all that matters when political parties are
allowed to form.
Although this paper constitutes, to the best of our knowledge, the first attempt
to study endogenous parties in the context of labor market policies, we observe
that other theoretical papers have come up with majorities made of the same two
types of agents. Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002) look at who may be in favor of
introducing a positive EPL together with short term, flexible work contracts, and
obtain that “any worker whose job is not directly threatened by such a reform will be
in favor of it. This includes all the unemployed and all long-term job holders, which
clearly make a majority.” (p. 85) This majority corresponds to the winning coalition
obtained in our paper, once we observe that high-ability workers are those with the
smallest probability of getting fired. In another context, Vindigni (2008) obtains
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endogenously the same kind of alliance when studying the political determination
of the EPL when workers have a large bargaining weight and the economy starts
with a low EPL: a group made of unemployed and large productivity workers is then
pitted against a group made of low productivity workers.
An open question is of course whether our result that the decisive coalition is
made of unemployed and of high ability (and low firing probability) employed has
some empirical support. It is difficult to test this proposition, for various reasons.
As we have explained in the introduction, our desire to model endogenous parties
comes from the observation that it is very difficult to state at the outset which
constituency a party represents (such as left parties representing “labor” and right
parties representing “capital”). Our results confirm our reluctance to associate ex
ante specific parties with constituencies, given the surprising winning coalition that
we obtain. This in turn means that to test the empirical validity of our result
requires delving into the specifics of each country. Moreover, the large number of
dimensions voters care about (beyond labor market policies) makes it difficult to
identify who supports a party because of its labor market policies, as opposed to
other policies.
This exercise is of course beyond the scope of this paper, but we observe that po-
litical scientist David Rueda provides a narrative of labor market policies in Britain
which fits quite well with our model and its results (Rueda, 2006). The two dimen-
sions of labor policies on which he focuses are the EPL and active labor market poli-
cies (ALMP), rather than unemployment benefits in our model. He observes that,
before 1970, in the UK, the employment risks were low so that the Labour party
represented workers (or “labour”) as an aggregate. He contends that, with the advent
of massive unemployment in the 70ies and 80ies, the Labour party has increasingly
represented the insiders, at the expense of the unemployed. Although Rueda does
not allow explicitly for a separation between low- and high-ability workers, he ex-
plains that unions were extremely powerful within the Labour Party (“through the
use of "block voting", unions controlled 80 per cent of the votes in Labour party
congresses until 1993” p.391), and that “historically, they had advanced the interests
of already skilled workers” (p 392), which fits with our description of high-ability
workers. Under Labour governments until 1971, EPL was very high, and ALMP
nearly non existent. Rueda then states that “the decline of employment protection
in Britain coincided with the emergence of New Labour and a distancing between the
party and the unions” (p. 393), with the union block voting reduced first to 70% and
then to 50% (and a similar drop in the union share of party financing). Rueda then
describes how New Labour moved away from EPL and towards (ALMP) policies
“aimed at young people, single parents, sick and disabled people and the long-term
unemployed” (p 394). This narrative fits our model quite well, with the Labour
Party representing both skilled workers and unemployed, its policy platform being
determined according to the bargaining weight of the unions (representing the skilled
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workers) within the party, and with a lowering of the influence of unions translating
in a policy more closely attuned to the preferences of the unemployed, with lower
EPL but larger ALMP.23
This narrative stresses the importance of the bargaining power of the different
factions inside the Labour party. This resonates very well with our approach, where
equilibria do exist (notwithstanding the multidimensionality of the policy space) but
are typically multiple : while Proposition 3 restricts the set of equilibrium policies
to a subset of the contract curve of high-ability workers and unemployed, it does not
pinpoint which equilibrium will emerge. More precisely, we are agnostic as to the
relative bargaining weight of the two types who constitute this party. Explaining
why certain countries end up at a precise location on this contract curve would
require to refine the equilibrium concept and to endogenize bargaining weights. We
leave this worthwhile but very complex question to future research.
Appendix 1: The Economic Equilibrium
In this appendix, we show that there exists a lower bound  such that the economic
equilibrium has the following properties for all policy vectors (; ) 2 P whenever
 > :
(i) Capitalists’s consumption (and therefore payoff) is strictly positive;
(ii) It is always optimal for the firm to induce employed workers to invest in firm-
specific human capital.
(i) The following condition must be true for capitalists’ consumption to be strictly
positive: 
y + x  w

; 
1 + 
1  `

`

   > 0 .
As w is strictly increasing in  and  , the above condition holds for any (; ) 2 P
whenever
 > 1 

  `

y   w

1; 
1 + 
1  `

(`x) 1 .
23A more recent example is the last French presidential election, where candidate Sarkozy and
his right wing political party have simultaneously proposed policies catering to the employed (by
decreasing income taxes on additional hours worked, for instance) while at the same time favoring
the flexicurity model (and especially the decrease in EPL). His political campaign has been char-
acterized by the support of personalities known to represent outsiders, such as Martin Hirsch, the
former president of Emmaüs France.
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(ii) As the utility of capitalists is strictly increasing in consumption, it is optimal
for the firm to induce workers to invest in human capital if and only if
y + x  w

; 
1 + 
1  `

`

   

y    1 + 
1  `

`

  
or, equivalently,
  x 1

w

; 
1 + 
1  `

   1 + 
1  `

.
The above condition holds for any (; ) 2 P whenever
  2  max

x 1

w

1; 
1 + 
1  `

   1 + 
1  `

:  2 [0;  ]

,
where2’s existence is guaranteed byWeierstrass Theorem. Setting   max f1;2g,
we obtain the result.
Appendix 2: Proof of Lemma 1
A brief observation of policy preferences reveals that, for every  2 [0;  ],V (; ; ) is
strictly increasing everywhere in  if  2 feL; eHg, and strictly decreasing everywhere
if  2 fu; cg. This directly establishes the second statement in the lemma.
Let us turn to ideal tax rates. By strict concavity of V (; 1; ei) in  , ^ (ei) is
implicitly defined as the unique solution to the following equation (assuming an
interior solution):24
@V (; 1; ei)
@
=  p(1; ei)U 0 (wc   ) + [1  p(1; ei)]U 0


`+ 
1  `

`+ 
1  ` = 0:
Using the implicit function theorem together with curvature conditions on U , we
obtain that 0 < ^ (eH) < ^ (eL).
As   1, ` 2 (0; 1), and U 0 > 0, we also have
@V (; 0; u)
@
= p(0; u)


1 + 
1  `   1

U 0


1 + 
1  `   

+[1  p(0; u)] `+ 
1  `U
0


`+ 
1  `

> 0;
which implies that ^ (u) =  .
Finally, capitalists favor a zero tax. Indeed the average wage w is strictly in-
creasing in  , so that income taxation reduces both their pre- and after-tax incomes.
24Observe that, since U 00 < 0 and limc!0 U 0(c) =1, this equation has a (unique) solution which
is strictly smaller than wc. We then assume that  is larger than this value for eL, so that this
FOC holds with equality for both eL and eH .
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Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 1
The proof of Proposition 1 hinges on the following result.
Lemma 2 (^(eL); ^(eL)) is a strict Condorcet winner in f^ () ; ^()g2.
Proof: To prove Lemma 2, it suffices to check that the following inequalities
hold:
V (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL) ; eH) > V (^ (u) ; ^ (u) ; eH) ; (6)
V (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL) ; u) > V (^ (eH) ; ^ (eH) ; u) ; (7)
V (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL) ; u) > V (^ (c) ; ^ (c) ; u) : (8)
To establish (6), note first that
V (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL) ; eH) V (^ (u) ; ^ (u) ; eH) = [V (^ (eL) ; 1; eH) V (^ (u) ; 1; eH)]
+ [V (^ (u) ; 1; eH) V (^ (u) ; 0; eH)] :
As V (; ; eH) is strictly increasing in , the second bracketed term on the right-
hand side of the above equality is positive. By the strict concavity of V (; 1; eH),
V (; 1; eH) is single-peaked with its peak at ^ (eH) < ^ (eL) < ^ (u). This shows
that the first bracketed term is also positive, thus proving that the eH-politician
strictly prefers (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)) to (^ (u) ; ^ (u)).
Inequality (7) results from the facts that ^ (eL) = ^ (eH) ; ^ (eL) > ^ (eH)
(Lemma 1) and that V (; ; u) is strictly increasing in  for any value of .
Finally, inequality (8) follows from the observation that U 0 > 0 and that
V (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL) ; u) = p (1; u)U

^ (eL)


1 + 
1  `   1

+[1  p (1; u)]U

^ (eL)
`+ 
1  `

;
where the arguments in both utility functions U are positive, while
V (^ (c) ; ^ (c) ; u) = U(0):
This ends the proof of Lemma 2.

Proof of Proposition 1:
 One-candidate equilibria
An immediate consequence of Lemma 2 is that there is a unique one-candidate
0-equilibrium, in which the eL-politician runs alone and implements her ideal policy.
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 Two-candidate equilibria
By assumption, parties who are indifferent between running and not running
choose not to run. As a consequence, a situation in which a candidate loses with
a probability of one cannot be an equilibrium. Combined with Lemma 2, this
observation implies that there is no two-candidate 0-equilibrium in which the eL-
politician runs.
The eH- and c-politicians running against each other cannot be an equilibrium,
since ` > (1+)=2 and an argument similar to the one made in the proof of inequality
(6) in Lemma 1 establishes that voters of type eL strictly prefer (^ (eH) ; ^ (eH)) to
(^ (c) ; ^ (c)).
Suppose now that the two running candidates are the u- and c-politicians. If the
voters of type eL strictly prefer (^ (u) ; ^ (u)) to (^ (c) ; ^ (c)), then the u-politician
wins for sure since, by assumption, 1   ` > (1 + )=2. If they instead (weakly)
prefer (^ (c) ; ^ (c)) to (^ (u) ; ^ (u)), then the eH-politician has a profitable deviation.
Indeed, the latter could run and get the votes of voters of type eL who strictly
prefer (^ (eH) ; ^ (eH)) to (^ (c) ; ^ (c)) and therefore to (^ (u) ; ^ (u)). This would
thus enable her to implement her ideal policy with a probability of 1.
Finally, the eH- and u-politicians running against each other cannot be a 0-
equilibrium either. To see this, note first that a tie between these two candi-
dates requires that voters of type eL to be indifferent between (^ (u) ; ^ (u)) and
(^ (eH) ; ^ (eH)). If type-c voters prefer (^ (u) ; ^ (u)) to (^ (eH) ; ^ (eH)), then the
eL-politician has a profitable deviation. She can indeed enter the electoral competi-
tion and implement her ideal policy since (1 )` > ` = +1  `. If type-c voters
are indifferent between (^ (u) ; ^ (u)) and (^ (eH) ; ^ (eH)), then the eL-politician en-
ters and wins since (1   )` > 1   ` + 
2
= ` + 
2
. If type-c voters strictly prefer
(^ (eH) ; ^ (eH)) to (^ (u) ; ^ (u)), then the eL-politician can also profitably enter
since, in that case, (1  )` > 1  ` = + ` (Assumption 1(a)).
 Three-candidate equilibria
From our assumptions on the distribution of types, three-candidate elections in
which the eL-politician runs cannot be equilibrium situations (at least one running
candidate would loose for sure).
Consider now the case where the eH-, u-, and c-politicians run against each
other. It must be the case that the three politicians tie for winning. But then the
eL-politician should enter the contest and win for sure since the low-ability employed
outnumber all the other types of voters.
 Four-candidate equilibria
There cannot be a four-candidate equilibrium, for some candidates would loose
for sure in such an equilibrium (Assumption 1(a)).

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Appendix 4: Proof of Proposition 2
Hereafter, we use the following notation:
1  ffeH ; eLg ; fug ; fcgg ; 2  ffeHg ; feL; ug ; fcgg
3  ffeHg ; feL; cg ; fugg ; 4  ffeH ; ug ; feLg ; fcgg
5  ffeH ; cg ; feLg ; fugg ; 6  ffeHg ; feLg ; fu; cgg
7  ffeH ; eLg ; fu; cgg ; 8  ffeH ; cg ; feL; ugg
9  ffeH ; ug ; feL; cgg ; 10  ffeH ; eL; ug ; fcgg
11  ffeH ; eL; cg ; fugg ; 12  ffeH ; u; cg ; feLgg
13  ffeHg ; feL; u; cgg ; 14  ffeH ; eL; u; cgg
The following two lemmas are used in the proofs of both Proposition 2 and
Proposition 3:
Lemma 3 Suppose C1 holds. Then the following statements are true:
(i) PfeH ;ug   (4) 6= ;.
(ii) For any j 2 f4; 12g, (; ) 2  (j) only if
V (; ; )  V (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL) ; ) ;8 2 feH ; ug : (9)
(iii) If (9) holds with a strict inequality, then (; ) 2  (4) \  (12).
(iv) There is no EPS involving 12.
Proof: Note first that, since (1   )` > , there cannot be three-candidate
4-equilibria. To prove the first part of the lemma, therefore, it suffices to show
that there exists (1; 1) 2 PfeH ;ug that is a strict Condorcet winner in f(1; 1) ;
(^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)) ; (^ (c) ; ^ (c))g.
From C1, there exists (1; 1) 2 PfeH ;ug, which is preferred to (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)) by
voters of type eH and u. As a consequence, (1; 1) must satisfy
0 < 1 < ^ (eL) and 0  1 < ^ (eL) : (10)
This implies that voters of type c also strictly prefer (1; 1) to (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)),
thus proving that the former is majority-preferred to the latter. Furthermore, the
inequalities in (10) also guarantee that voters of type eL strictly prefer (1; 1) to
(^ (c) ; ^ (c)). Inequality (8) shows that type u prefers (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)) to (^ (c) ; ^ (c)),
and since they also prefer (1; 1) to (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)), we obtain that a majority
formed of types eL and u prefer (1; 1) to (^ (c) ; ^ (c)). This establishes part (i).
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Part (ii) follows directly from part (i) and from the fact that feH ; eLg and fu; eLg
are majority coalitions.
If (9) holds with a strict inequality, then we can apply to (; ) the same argument
as in the proof of part (i) to show that (; ) is both a 4- and a 12-equilibrium
policy, proving part (iii).
Finally, consider party structure 12 and a political state in which party feH ; u; cg
offers a policy (; ). From part (ii), this implies that (; ) must satisfy (9). From
part (iii) and (C1), this in turn implies that, by definition of PfeH ;ug, there exists
( 0; 0) 2  (4) and a sufficiently small " 2 (0; b=6) such that:
V ( 0; 0; ) > V (; ; )  "
for each  2 feH ; ug. As a consequence, coalition feH ; ug can profitably deviate by
inducing 4 and then ( 0; 0). This indeed makes all its members strictly better-off
as they thereby increase their non-policy benefit by (b=2)  (b=3) = b=6 > ".

Lemma 4  (9) = ;.
Proof: We first establish that if (; ) 2  (9), then (; ) 2 PfeH ;ug. Suppose
that party feL; cg offers a policy (; ) in PfeL;cg n PfeH ;ug. Hence, either (; ) 2
P1  PfeL;cg n PfeH ;eL;ug or (; ) 2 P2  PfeL;cg n PfeH ;c;ug. In both cases, there is
consequently a policy ( 0; 0) that makes a majority better-off than under (; ). It
is easy to check that there is always such a policy in PfeH ;ug. This implies that party
feH ; ug has a profitable deviation whenever party feL; cg runs alone and offers a
policy that does not belong to PfeH ;ug.
A tie between the two parties in 9 is impossible when party feL; cg offers a
policy (; ) in PfeL;cg n PfeH ;ug. From our assumptions on the distribution of types,
a tie would indeed imply that each politician (and then each type of voter) strictly
prefers her party’s platform to the rival’s platform. Let (1; 1) and (2; 2) be
parties feH ; ug’ and feL; cg’s platforms, respectively. If (2; 2) 2 P2, this implies
that
1 < 2 , and 1 < 2 ,
which in turn implies that type-c voters strictly prefer (1; 1) to (2; 2); a con-
tradiction. Instead, if (2; 2) 2 P1, then 2 < 1, and 1 > 2. As the marginal
benefits of  and  are lower for eH than for eL,V (1; 1; eH) > V (2; 2; eH) implies
V (1; 1; eL) > V (2; 2; eL); a contradiction. As a consequence, a tie must involve
the two parties offering f( ; )g  PfeH ;ug\PfeL;cg and is therefore inconsistent with
the partisan-equilibrium restriction.
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Finally, if party feH ; ug runs alone and offers a policy (; ) 6= ( ; ), then party
feL; cg can defeat it by offering ( ; ). If feH ; ug runs alone and offers ( ; ), then
feL; cg can again profitably deviate by offering ( ; ). This does not change the
electoral outcome but raises its members’ non-policy benefit by b=4.

Proof of Proposition 2: (i) Note first that by condition C1 and Lemma 3 (iii)
there exists a 4-equilibrium in which the eH- and u-politicians are strictly better-
off than under (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)). This implies that none of them has an incentive
to induce 0. Further, since the policy they implement in the 4-equilibrium must
belong to their Pareto set, they cannot profitably induce a party structure in which
they would have coalesced with other politicians. This would indeed make at least
one of them as well- or worse-off and would also reduce their non-policy benefits.
What remains to be proved, therefore, is that feL; cg cannot profitably induce
9. This is a direct consequence of Lemma 4.
(ii) If condition C1 does not hold, then the following is true for all (; ) 2 PfeH ;ug:
V (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL) ; )  V (; ; ) for some  2 feH ; ug .
As (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)) =2 PfeH ;ug, this implies that, for all (; ) 2 PfeH ;ug, at least
one member of feH ; ug strictly prefers (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)) to (; ). To see this, sup-
pose by contradiction, that there exists (; ) 2 PfeH ;ug such that both members
of feH ; ug are indifferent between (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)) and (; ). Our curvature condi-
tions on payoff functions then imply that (^ (eL) + (1  ); ^ (eL) + (1  )),
 2 (0; 1), is strictly preferred to (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)) by both eH and u; a contradiction
with (; ) 2 PfeH ;ug. Thus, when C1 does not hold, (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)) is a Condorcet
winner in PfeH ;ug [ f(^ (eL) ; ^ (eL))g (recall that feH ; eLg and feL; ug are both ma-
jority coalitions). We now use this result to prove the following
Claim 1: If C1 does not hold, then  (j) = f(^ (eL) ; ^ (eL))g for any j 2
f4; 5; 6; 12g.
We start with party structure 4. By the same logic as in the proof of Lemma 3
(i), there cannot be a 4-equilibrium in which the three parties run. As (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL))
is majority preferred to (^ (c) ; ^ (c)) (Lemma 2) and to all elements of PfeH ;ug, this
implies that  (4) = f(^ (eL) ; ^ (eL))g.
Consider now party structure 5. By the same logic as in the proof of Lemma 5,
only two parties may run in a 5-equilibrium: feH ; cg and feLg (Note that this does
not depend on whether C2 holds or not). Suppose that, contrary to the statement
of the Claim, party feH ; cg offers a policy (; ) in a 5-equilibrium. This implies
that both the eH- and the u-politicians (weakly) prefer (; ) to (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL))
(otherwise, feLg could win for sure). By definition of a Pareto set, there must be
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an alternative ( 0; 0) 2 PfeH ;ug (which may coincide with (; )) such that both
type-eH and type-u voters (weakly) prefer ( 0; 0) to (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)); a contradiction
with the assumption that C1 does not hold.
By the same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 3, at most two parties
can run in a 6-equilibrium. We first prove that f?; (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)) ;?g is a 6-
equilibrium. If a party S 6= feLg had a profitable deviation, this would mean that
there is a policy in its Pareto set that can get the support both eH- and u-voters
against (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)). But this would in turn imply that there also exists a policy
in PfeH ;ug which is weakly preferred to (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)) by all members of feH ; ug; a
contradiction with the assumption that C1 does not hold. By the same logic, we can
rule out 6-equilibria in which a party S 6= feLg runs alone or against feLg. The
only remaining case is of the form f(^ (eH) ; ^ (eH)) ;?; (; )g. This would require
voters of type eL to be indifferent between (^ (eH) ; ^ (eH)) and (; ), and therefore
that ` = 1  `+ . As  < 1=2, we therefore have (1  )` > ` = 1  `+ . The
eL could therefore profitably deviate by offering eL-voters’ ideal policy. This shows
that (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)) is only possible policy outcome in a 6-equilibrium.
Finally, consider party structure 12. Suppose that, contrary to the statement
of the claim, there is a 12-equilibrium in which party feH ; u; cg runs and offers a
policy (; ) 2 PfeH ;u;cg. This implies that voters of types eH and u prefer (; )
to (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)). By definition of PfeH ;ug, however, this implies that there ex-
ists ( 0; 0) 2 PfeH ;ug such voters of types eH and u also (weakly) prefer ( 0; 0) to
(^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)); a contradiction. Hence, party feLg running unopposed is the only
12-equilibrium.

To see that there exists an EPS (;p) in which (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)) is the unique pol-
icy outcome, consider party structure 0. From Proposition 1,  (0) = f(^ (eL) ; ^ (eL))g.
In this 0-equilibrium, the eL-politician can implement her ideal policy and obtain
the entire benefit b. Hence, she will never agree to induce another party structure.
The only coalitional deviations from 0 we need to consider are therefore to 4, 5,
6, and 12. But we know from Claim 1 that such deviations would yield the same
outcome as in 0. This proves that (0; f?; (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)) ;?;?g) is an EPS.
We now complete the proof of part (ii) of Proposition 2 by showing that there is
no EPS involving party structures in fj : j = 1; 2; 3; 7; 8; 9; 10; 11; 13; 14g. The eL-
politician can induce 6 from 7 and 13, 5 from 8 and 11, 4 from 10, 12 from
14, and 0 from any structure in fj : j = 1; 2; 3g. By Claim 1, such deviations
would always be profitable to the eL-politician, for they would allow her to enforce
her ideal policy without having to share the non-policy benefit b > 0. Finally,
 (9) = ; (Lemma 4).

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Appendix 5: Proof of Proposition 3
We start with the following lemma:
Lemma 5 If C2 holds, then  (5) = f(^ (eL) ; ^ (eL))g :
Proof: First of all, note that there cannot be a three-candidate 5-equilibrium
since (1 )` > 1  `. Neither can there be a 5-equilibrium of the form f(; ) ;?;
(^ (u) ; ^ (u))g. This would indeed require voters of type eL to be indifferent between
the platforms offered by feH ; cg and fug, and therefore that ` +  = 1   `. As
(1  )` > 1  `, feLg would consequently have a profitable deviation.
Condition C2 guarantees that (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)) is strict a Condorcet winner in
PfeH ;cg [ f(^ (eL) ; ^ (eL))g [ f(^ (u) ; ^ (u))g. This implies that feLg running alone
and implementing her ideal policy is the unique 5-equilibrium, thus completing the
proof of the lemma.

Proof of Proposition 3: We proceed by proving that conditions C1-C3 imply that
the following statement is true for every j = 0; : : : ; 14:
(Sj) If ( ; ) is a policy that emerges with a positive probability in an EPS
(j;p), then ( ; ) 2 PfeH ;ug, and
V ( ; ; )  V (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL) ; ) ,8 2 feH ; ug .
(Sj) is evidently true for j = 1; 2; 3 since we know from Proposition 1 that the
eL-politician can always profitably induce 0. Let us now study the other party
structures.
 j = 0
By condition C1 and part (iii) in Lemma 3, coalition feH ; ug can profitably
induce 4. This proves that there is no EPS involving 0.
 j = 4
(S4) is a direct corollary of part (i) in Lemma 3.
 j = 5
Suppose (5;p) is an EPS. We know from Lemma 5 that this implies that p =
f?; (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)) ;?g. By Lemma 3 (iii) and condition C1, therefore, feH ; u; cg
can profitably induce 12; a contradiction with (5;p) being an EPS.
 j = 6
A tie between the three parties in 6 is impossible since the low-ability workers
outnumber the high-ability workers.
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Suppose that feHg and feLg run against each other. This cannot be an equilib-
rium situation since voters of type u strictly prefer (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)) to (^ (eH) ; ^ (eH))
and (1 )`+1  ` > (1+)=2. Moreover, this also proves that feHg running alone
cannot be a 6-equilibrium.
Condition C3 ensures that voters of type eL strictly prefer (^ (eH) ; ^ (eH)) to
any policy in Pfu;cg. As a consequence, there cannot be equilibria of the form
f?;?; (; )g, or f(^ (eH) ; ^ (eH)) ;?; (; )g, (; ) 2 Pfu;cg.
Consider now a political state of the form (6;p). An immediate consequence
of the previous paragraphs is that either p = f?; (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)) ;?g or p =
f?; (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)) ; (; 0)g, (; 0) 2 Pfu;cg. In the former case, (6;p) cannot be
an EPS as coalition feH ; u; cg can profitably induce 12 (Lemma 3 (iii) and condi-
tion C1).
In the latter case, voters of type eH must be indifferent between (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL))
and (; 0) (otherwise one of the two candidates would win for sure), and voters of
types u and c must strictly prefer (; 0) to (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)). By continuity, there
consequently exists a sufficiently small " > 0 such that
V (; "; )  V (; 0; ) > 1
2
V (; 0; )+
1
2
V (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL) ; ) > V (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL) ; )
for each  2 fu; cg, and
V (; "; eH) > V (; 0; eH) = V (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL) ; eH) :
If (; ") 2 PfeH ;u;cg, then (; ") 2  (12). Otherwise, by continuity of V and com-
pactness of P , there exists ( 0; 0) 2 PfeH ;u;cg which is weakly preferred to (; ") by
all members of feH ; u; cg and therefore belongs to  (12).
Coalition feH ; u; cg can thus profitably induce 12. Indeed, this makes all its
members better-off in utility terms and also raises their non-policy benefits (by
b=3  b=4 for the u- and c-politicians and by b=3 for the eH-politician).
 j = 7
A 7-equilibrium must involve feH ; eLg running alone: if fu; cg offers a policy
(; 0), then feH ; eLg can win for sure by offering (max f; ^(eH)g ; 1) if   ^(eL),
and (^(eL); 1) otherwise. Hence,  (7)  PfeH ;eLg.
Suppose first that party feH ; eLg implements a policy (; 1) with  < ^ (eL).
Given that (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)) is the u-politician’s ideal policy in PfeH ;eLg, the latter
should induce 1 since a direct consequence of Lemma 2 is that party feH ; eLg
running alone and implementing (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)) is a 1-equilibrium.
Furthermore, there exists by continuity a sufficiently small  > 0 such that
(^ (eL)  ; ^ (eL)) 2 PfeH ;eLg also defeats u’ and c’s ideal policies in a pairwise vote.
This implies that (^ (eL)  ; ^ (eL)) 2  (1). Suppose now that feH ; eLg imple-
ments (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)) in a 7-equilibrium. The c-politician can profitably induce 1,
for she strictly prefers (^ (eL)  ; ^ (eL)) to (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)).
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 j = 8
From Lemma 5, there cannot be an EPS involving 8 since the eL-politician is
always better-off inducing 5.
 j = 9
(S9) is a trivial consequence of Lemma 4.
 j = 10
In a 10-equilibrium, feH ; eL; ug must win for sure. For (10; ((; );?)) to be
an EPS, however, the following must hold:
V (; ; eH) > V (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL) ; eH)
(otherwise feH ; eLg can induce 1 and get b=2 instead of b=3) and
V (; ; u) > V (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL) ; u)
(otherwise fu; eLg can induce 2 and get b=2 instead of b=3).
Now, suppose that (; ) =2 PfeH ;ug. Then feH ; ug should induce 4 in order to
implement a policy in PfeH ;ug, which all its members prefer to (; ) (Lemma 3 (iii)).
This would also allow them to get b=2 instead of b=3.
 j = 11
There is no EPS involving 11 as the eL-politician can induce 5, thus imple-
menting her ideal policy and getting b > b=3 (Lemma 5).
 j = 12
(S12) is a direct corollary of part (iv) in Lemma 3.
 j = 13
Suppose party feL; u; cg offers a policy (; ) in an EPS involving structure 13.
This implies that voters of type eL must prefer (; ) to (^ (eH) ; ^ (eH)) (otherwise
party feHg could win the election by offering her ideal policy). Since
(; ) 2 PfeL;ug : V (; ; eL) > V (^ (eH) ; ^ (eH) ; eL)
	    2 ;
it is profitable for feL; ug to induce 2. Doing so, it can implement a policy that
makes its members at least as well-off than (; ) and increase their non-policy
benefit by b=2  b=3 > 0. This proves that there is no EPS involving 13.
 j = 14
Let (~ ; ~) 2  (14), and assume that (~ ; ~) =2 PfeH ;ug = PfeH ;eL;ug \ PfeH ;u;cg.
This implies that either (~ ; ~) 2 PfeH ;eL;ug n PfeH ;ug or (~ ; ~) 2 PfeH ;u;cg n PfeH ;ug.
If (~ ; ~) 2 PfeH ;eL;ug nPfeH ;ug, then coalition feH ; u; cg can profitably induce 12.
This indeed allows its members to implement a policy they all prefer to (~ ; ~) and
to raise their non-policy benefit by b=3   b=4. If (~ ; ~) 2 PfeH ;u;cg n PfeH ;ug, then
coalition feH ; eL; ug can similarly raise its members’ payoffs by inducing 10. Thus,
(~ ; ~) must belong to PfeH ;ug for (14; (~ ; ~)) to be an EPS.
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Now suppose (~ ; ~) 2 PfeH ;ug but
V (~ ; ~; u) < V (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL) ; u) .
Coalition feL; ug can then profitably induce 8. Enforcing (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)), it can
thus raise its members’ policy and non-policy benefits.
Finally, coalition feH ; eLg can similarly induce 7 if (~ ; ~) 2 PfeH ;ug but
V (~ ; ~; eH) < V (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL) ; eH) ,
thus raising its members’ policy and non-policy benefits.

Appendix 6: Necessary conditions for conditions C1-
C3 to hold
Result 1 For any parametric configuration of the model, there exists xH 2 (xL; 1)
and 1 2 (0; 1) such that, ceteris paribus:
(i) Conditions C1 and C2 hold if xH 2 (xH ; 1); and
(ii) condition C3 holds if (1) 2 (1; 1).
Proof: (i) Condition C1 holds if and only if the indifference curve of the eH
politician passing through (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)) is steeper (in the (; ) space) than the
indifference curve of the u-politician passing through (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)) (see Figure 1).
Simple computations reveal that the slopes of the eH- and u-politicians’ indifference
35
curves passing through (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)) are, respectively,
SLH (xH) 
8>><>>:(1  xH) 0(1)

U (wc   ^ (eL))  U

^ (eL)
`+ 
1  `

| {z }
>0
9>>=>>;
 1

8>><>>:[xH + (1  xH)(1)]U 0 (wc   ^ (eL))| {z }>0   [1  xH   (1  xH)(1)]
`+ 
1  `U
0

^ (eL)
`+ 
1  `

| {z }
>0
9>>=>>; ;
and (11)
SLu (xH) 
8>><>>:(1  x)0(1)
`
1  `

U

^ (eL)
1 + 
1  `   ^ (eL)

  U

^ (eL)
`+ 
1  `

| {z }
>0
9>>=>>;
 1


(1  x) [1  (1)] `
1  `


1 + 
1  `   1

U 0

^ (eL)
1 + 
1  `   ^ (eL)

+

1  (1  x) [1  (1)] `
1  `

`+ 
1  `U
0

^ (eL)
`+ 
1  `

.
Hence,
0 < lim
xH!1
SLu (xH) <1 = lim
xH!1
SLH (xH) .
By continuity, therefore, there must exist x1 < 1 such that C1 holds whenever
xH 2 (x1; 1).
For condition C2 to hold, type-u citizens must strictly prefer (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)) to
any policy in the Pareto set of coalition feH ; cg. As xH becomes arbitrarily close to
1, this Pareto set becomes arbitrarily close to f(; ) 2 P :  = 0g ( (eH) tends to
0). As the utility of type-u citizens is zero at any policy in f(; ) 2 P :  = 0g and
^ (eL) > 0, we have
lim
xH!1
V (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL) ; u) > 0 > V (; ; u)
for all (; ) 2 f(; ) 2 P :  = 0g. By continuity, there consequently exists x2 < 1
such that C1 holds whenever xH 2 (x2; 1). Hence, we obtain part (i) of Result 1 by
setting H  max fxL; x1; x2g.
(ii) As (1) becomes arbitrarily close to unity, the ideal policy of type-eL citizens
becomes arbitrarily close to (^ (eH) ; ^ (eH)). Then,
lim
(1)!1
V (^ (eH) ; ^ (eH) ; eL) = lim
(1)!1
V (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL) ; eL) > V (; 0; eL)
for all  2 [0; 1]. As above, we obtain the result by continuity.
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Appendix 7: EPS if C2 or C3 does not hold.
We contend in the text that conditions C1 to C3 are very reasonable, because
sufficient conditions on xH and (1) for C1 to C3 to hold are either innocuous or
empirically relevant. More precisely, condition C3 holds if (1) is large enough,
which is an innocuous assumption since it only requires to allow for policies that
would nearly prevent any firm from firing workers (for instance, by making it illegal
or extremely expensive, except in very specific circumstances). We already know
that C1 is both necessary and sufficient to have EPS exhibiting a negative correlation
between UB and EPL. Observe that C1 holds if xH is sufficiently large, which is also a
sufficient condition for C2 to hold (although the threshold values of xH above which
conditions C1 and C2 hold are different). Moreover, empirical evidence strongly
suggests that xH is indeed large.
One may nevertheless wonder what types of additional EPS may exist if condi-
tions C2 and C3 are not satisfied (while C1 holds). Recall that conditions C2 and
C3 are only sufficient to rule out policy outcomes outside the Pareto set of ability
workers and unemployed. The next result describes what EPSs – other than those
described in Proposition 3 – could exist when C1 holds but C2 and C3 do not.
Result 2 Suppose C1 holds. If (;p) is an EPS such that  () * PfeH ;ug, then one
of the following statements is true:
(i) C2 does not hold,  = ffeH ; cg ; feLg; fugg, and
 ()  ( 0; 0) 2 PfeH ;cg : V ( 0; 0; )  V (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL) ; ) ; 8 2 feH ; ug	 .
(ii) C3 does not hold,  = ffeHg ; feLg; fu; cgg, and
 ()  ( 0; 0) 2 Pfu;cg : V ( 0; 0; ej)  V (^ (ek) ; 1; ej) ;8j; k 2 fL;Hg; j 6= k	 .
Proof of Result 2: Let (;p) be an EPS such that  () * PfeH ;ug, and let
(; ) 2 (). Note that, as C1 holds, Lemma 3 applies. We can thus use the
same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 3 to show that  =2 fj : j =
0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 7; 9; 10; 12; 13; 14g.
Suppose  = 5. By the same logic as in the proof of Proposition 3, there are only
three possible types of 5-equilibria: (1) feLg runs alone; (2) there is a tie between
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feH ; cg and feLg; and (3) feH ; cg runs unopposed and, therefore, (; ) 2 PfeH ;cg. We
already know that case (1) cannot be an EPS (Lemma 3 (iii) and condition C1). Case
(2) implies that voters of type u are indifferent between (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)) and the policy
( 0; 0) offered by feH ; cg. But this cannot be a 5-equilibrium: By continuity of
payoff functions, there exists ( 00; 00) 2 PfeH ;cg in an "-neighborhood of ( 0; 0), with
" > 0 arbitrarily small, such that all members of feH ; u; cg strictly prefer ( 00; 00)
to (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)). A deviation to ( 00; 00) is therefore strictly profitable to party
feH ; cg: the party wins for sure and any arbitrarily small utility loss (" is arbitrarily
small) is compensated by the increase in non-utility benefits (b=2)  (b=4) > 0. For
case (3) to constitute an EPS, f(; );?;?g has to be a 5-equilibrium. That is,
feLg must not have a profitable deviation; this requires the following condition to
be true:
V (; ; )  V (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL) ; ) ;8 2 feH ; ug . (12)
Hence, C2 does not hold.
Suppose now that  = 6. By the same logic as in the proof of Proposition
3, there are only two possible types of EPSs with 6: (1) there is a tie between
fu; cg and feHg; and (2) fu; cg runs alone and, therefore, (; ) 2 Pfu;cg. Case (1)
requires voters of type eL to be indifferent between the policies offered by fu; cg
and feHg, and therefore that ` = 1   ` + . As  < 1=2, we must then have
(1  )` > ` = 1  `+ . This in turn implies that feLg can profitably deviate: it
wins with probability 1 if it runs and offers its ideal policy. For case (2) to constitute
an EPS, f?;?; (; )g has to be a 6-equilibrium. That is, neither feLg nor feHg
can profitably deviate; this requires the following condition to be true:
V (; 0; ej)  V (^ (ek) ; 1; ej) ; 8j; k 2 fL;Hg; j 6= k .
Hence, C3 does not hold.
If  = 8, then party feL; ug must win for sure (recall that feL; ug consti-
tutes a majority coalition), so that (; ) 2 PfeL;ug. Furthermore, (; ) must be
equal to (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)); otherwise the eH-politician can profitably induce 2. In-
deed (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)) 2  (2) — recall that u strictly prefers (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)) to both
(^ (eH) ; ^ (eH)) and (^ (c) ; ^ (c)) — and (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)) is the eH-politician’s most-
preferred policy in PfeL;ug.
If  (5) = f(^ (eL) ; ^ (eL))g, then the eL-politician can profitably induce 5
from 8: Doing so, she can indeed enforce her ideal policy and receive the entire
benefit b. If  (5) 6= f(^ (eL) ; ^ (eL))g, then party feH ; cg can win with a positive
probability when pitted against feLg in party structure 5. This implies that some
(1; 1) 2 PfeH ;cg must satisfy (12) with a strict inequality for at least one element of
feH ; ug. By continuity, this in turn implies that there exists some (2; 2) 2 PfeH ;cg
in an arbitrarily small neighborhood of (1; 1) such that
V (2; 2; ) > V (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL) ; ) ;8 2 feH ; u; cg .
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Hence,  (5) comprises policies in PfeH ;cg that are strictly preferred to (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL))
by all members of feH ; u; cg. This implies that, in party structure 8, party feH ; cg
can profitably deviate by offering such a policy when party feL; ug offers (^ (eL) ; ^ (eL)).
This proves that there is no EPS involving 8; a contradiction with  = 8.
If  = 11, party feH ; eL; cg must win for sure by offering (; ) 2 PfeH ;eL;cg.
This implies that voters of type eL (weakly) prefer (; ) to (^ (u) ; ^ (u)); otherwise
fug could profitably deviate by offering its ideal policy. Hence:
(; ) 2 P0 

( 0; 0) 2 PfeH ;eL;cg : V ( 0; 0; eL)  V (^ (u) ; ^ (u) ; eL)
	
.
Now, let
P1  f( 0; 0) 2 P0 : V ( 0; 0; eL) > V (^ (eH) ; ^ (eH) ; eL)g ,
P2  f( 0; 0) 2 P0 : V ( 0; 0; eL)  V (^ (eH) ; ^ (eH) ; eL)g .
Thus, either (; ) 2 P1 or (; ) 2 P2. In the former case, there exists a policy in
P4 

( 0; 0) 2 PfeL;cg \ P1 : V ( 0; 0; eL) > V (^ (eH) ; ^ (eH) ; eL)
	
that is preferred to (; ) by all members of feL; cg. It is readily checked that
by construction P4   (3): any element of P4 is strictly preferred by u and eL
to (^ (eH) ; ^ (eH)), and strictly preferred by eH and eL to (^ (u) ; ^ (u)). Coalition
feL; cg can therefore profitably induce 3. If (; ) 2 P2, thenV (^ (eH) ; ^ (eH) ; eL) 
V (^(u); ^(u); eL) (otherwise P2 = ;). This implies that PfeH ;eLg nf(^ (eH) ; ^ (eH))g
is a subset of  (1): By construction, any element of PfeH ;eLg n f(^ (eH) ; ^ (eH))g
is strictly preferred by u and eL to (^ (c) ; ^ (c)), and strictly preferred by eH and
eL to (^ (u) ; ^ (u)). By definition of a Pareto set, there consequently exists a pol-
icy ( 0; 0) 2 PfeH ;eLg (which may coincide with (; )) such that coalition feH ; eLg
can profitably induce 1 and enforce ( 0; 0). Doing so, it guarantees its members
at least the same utility from policy, and increases their non-utility benefits by
(b=2)  (b=3) = b=6 > 0. This proves that there is no EPS involving party structure
11, and thus ends the proof of Result 2.

First, observe that, even though we describe in Result 2 the characteristics of all
the EPSs that may appear when either C2 or C3 is not satisfied (while C1 holds),
we do not provide necessary conditions that would guarantee the existence of such
EPSs. Doing so would require to introduce other conditions on, for instance, the
functions U(:) and (:), and to develop even lengthier proofs.
The two types of potential EPS are quite intuitive. If C2 does not hold, then
a coalition of capitalists and high ability workers can propose some policy in their
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Pareto set that is favored by the unemployed to the most-preferred policy of the low
ability workers. The coalition of c and eH then wins the election with such a policy,
since type eL can not obtain the support of the unemployed with its most-preferred
policy. Observe that these potential equilibria are located on the upward-sloping
Pareto set of types eH and c, so that we should observe a positive correlation between
UB and EPL - the opposite of the empirical evidence. If C3 does not hold, meaning
that (1) is low, then there is enough difference in the preferences of the two types
of workers for the other two types of voters to take advantage of. Namely, capitalists
and unemployed coalesce to propose some policy with zero EPL that both the low-
and the high-ability workers prefer to the most-preferred policy of the other type
of workers. Observe that most countries exhibit at least some level of EPL, which
contradicts this type of EPS.
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